practical pursuit, a guide to public life, for rulers, their advisers, and citizens: to provide 'philosophy teaching by example', as one classic tag had it, or to be the 'guide to life' (magistra vitae), as Cicero famously put it. 10 It deployed analysis of the past precisely to shape the future. It is only in the past half--century that History gradually lost its public, future--oriented mission, though there are signs that its vocation -in a more critical, democratic, even radical guise -may be returning.
History's place in public life remains fragile and uncertain, to the point that historians now occupy very little space in policy debates, whether national, international, or global. This retreat to the margins is partly self--inflicted, partly the unintended consequence of professionalisation, partly the result of more aggressive claims to influence by other academics, especially by our colleagues in Economics. 11 But damage done still can be undone. New directions in historical work can help bring historians back into the marketplace of ideas. History is broadening its horizons in space and expanding its horizons in time. Where once historians preferred the microscope, we are reaching again for the telescope; landscapes as well as portraits are increasingly in the historian's repertoire; the long shot is once more joining the close--up as a major perspective on the past. No other form of humane inquiry is so well equipped to go wide and to go deep at the same time. And no other subject in the humanities -arguably, no other academic discipline -has the capacity to be at once trans--national and trans--temporal.
'Transnational' is now a widespread term of art among historians and other scholars. It has a history going back to the mid--19th century, where its origins can be found in comparative philology: 'trans--national' study meant looking for commonalities and connections between discreet national languages. Over the course of the twentieth century, the word had to be repeatedly rediscovered before 10 (Pseudo--)Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ars Rhetorica, 376 (attributing the line to Thucydides); Cicero, De Oratore, II. 36: 'Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis, qua voce alia nisi oratoris immortalitati commendatur?' ('By what voice other than the orator's is history-the witness of past times, the light of truth, the life of memory, the guide to life, the herald of antiquity-committed to immortality?'). 11 John Markoff and Verónica Montecinos, 'The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists', Journal of Public Policy 13 (1993): 37-68. it settled into academic vocabulary. International lawyers in the 1950s took it up as a word to cover new forms of law (like the regulation of the environment or outer space) that lay beyond state jurisdiction. And humanists and social scientists found it useful yet again in the last twenty years or so, as a term of art for all the ideas, processes and forms of both activity -human and non--human -that do not fit comfortably within the political boundaries of nations or states. 12 'Transtemporal' is a rather less frequently used word. 13 I have appropriated that term from anatomy, where it means '[c]rossing the temples; traversing the temporal lobe of the brain'. 14 In the context of history, it implies crossing time--periods and traversing the conventional segments -often quite short or quite narrow -into which historians conveniently slice up the past. Just as transnational history stresses linkages and comparisons across space, so we might say that transtemporal history deals with such connections across time. Transtemporal history can already be found in the idea of various 'long' centuries: the long twentieth century; the long eighteenth century; even the long thirteenth century, are all popular among historians; in the movement to erase the boundary between history and so--called 'pre--history'; and in the various other species of long--range history -for example, Big History, Deep History, the history of the Anthropocene -I will mention later in this article.
Transnational history rejects the national frame that has structured so much historical writing since it became professionalised in the late nineteenth century; 15 transtemporal history revolts against conventional periodisations, especially those produced on the roughly biological timescales of, say, 20-50 years, that has characterised most historical writing since the 1970s. One captures the experiences of most of humanity more accurately than national history; the other presents a 12 Pierre--Yves Saunier, 'Transnational', Dictionary, s.v., 'transtemporal'. 15 Akira Iriye, Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) . more radical path for history in the future, and a means to bring history back into some of the most pressing debates in the present -debates about global governance, inequality, and the fate of the planet, for example. The ability to be at once trans--national and trans--temporal may in fact be key to History's evolutionary ability to survive academic catastrophe. As the editor of the American Historical Review recently noted, 'To reflect in some manner on questions of scale, in terms of both time and space, is clearly not new … But there seems a degree of urgency as well as self--consciousness that informs our interest in this question today that was not present before.' 16 That urgency comes both from within and from outside the historical profession. * * * * * History--writing became more than just the pursuit of interested amateurs in the late nineteenth century. It is from this moment that we can speak of a 'historical profession'. And like any new profession, it consciously equipped itself with all the paraphernalia of prestige and exclusivity: in this case, journals, professional associations, systems of gate--keeping, and accreditation mechanisms like the PhDall of which we still have with us today. More unwittingly, professional historians fitted their inquiries into the most readily available container for them: the nation--state. Professional history was born national and stayed that way, for most of the time, across most of the globe, until very recently.
Like most other social scientists, historians assumed that self--identifying nations, organised politically into states, were the primary objects of historical study.
The main tasks for historians of these communities were, accordingly, to narrate how nation--states emerged, how they developed, and how they interacted with one another. Even those historians whose work deliberately crossed the borders of national histories worked along similar lines and reaffirmed those borders. For example, diplomatic historians used national archives to reconstruct relations 16 In the last twenty years, historians have increasingly questioned the usefulness of these national frameworks for studying the past, moving towards studies they describe variously as international, transnational, comparative, and global. International historians often take for granted the existence of a society of states but look beyond state boundaries to map inter--state relationships, from diplomacy and finance to migration and cultural exchanges. Transnational historians examine processes, movements, and institutions that overflow territorial boundaries: for example, the environment, organised crime, epidemics, corporations, religions, and international social movements. Comparative historians deal with distinct historical subjects -which are often, but not always, nationally defined -in conjunction with each, although not always on the basis of any actual historical connection between their objects of study. And global historians treat the history and pre--histories of globalisation, the histories of objects that have become universalised, and the links between sub--global arenas such as the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans. The family resemblance that links these approaches is the desire to go above or beyond the histories of states defined by nations and of nations bounded by states. Most history, human and otherwise, took place in spaces larger than, or smaller than, the nation--state: to take account of this fact, we need to pay more attention arenas that were larger than nations, unconfined by the political boundaries of states, and connected by transnational linkages and circulations.
Most of the world's population, for most of recorded history, lived not in nation--states but in empires. For a relatively brief period, between the early sixteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of those empires were the outgrowths of confidently national cultures, particularly in Europe and Asia, but most were pre--national or supranational in composition. Oceanic spaces connected elements of many of these empires in the modern period, but maritime arenas such as the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, and the Pacific also segmented sovereignties and became cockpits of inter--imperial rivalry. 17 its transnational fortunes, I was able to begin answering the question, 'How did our modern world of states emerge from an earlier world of empires? '. 20 Most recently, in Foundations of Modern International Thought (2013) , I took that question further to ask, 'How did we -all of us in the world -come to imagine that we inhabit a world of states?'. 21 That feat of collective human imagination may be the single most important shift in political consciousness of the last five hundred years -bigger than the expansion of democracy, the rise of popular sovereignty, the spread of nationalism, or the proliferation of human rights, because each of these other developments depended on the creation of a world of states for its unfolding. It was in the early modern period, roughly between the early seventeenth century and the early nineteenth century, that the foundations of modern international thought were laid down. States, not individuals or corporate entities, were the primary actors in world affairs. These sovereign states operated under conditions of anarchy -that is, self--organisation without any controlling world government or other superior sovereign. Because they controlled who could, and could not, be recognised as a state, they created international organisationssuch as the United Nations -to police the actions of member--states of the club, with all others deemed to be rogues, pirates, or failed states. Ideology and myth sustained, and continues to sustain, this self--affirming international community: for example, the myth of a 'Westphalian' state--system that allegedly began in 1648. Breaking these myths, and realising how fragile many of our presuppositions about international politics are, can be salutary for questioning some of the assumptions of our political masters: for example, that the individual is necessarily subordinate to the state, that borders are impermeable (and therefore 'immigrants' should be kept beyond them), or that there is such a thing as a 'national' interest which trumps our duties of care for those beyond our frontiers. And, more generally, by seeing our own inherited arrangements as accidental and contingent, we may be in a better position to question them and to imagine alternatives. That is also a distinctive property of transtemporal history, to which I now turn. Only very recently has it rebounded again to between 75 and 100 years. 23 The shibboleths of specialism could be found across the world: a command of archives, sometimes the more obscure, the better; total control over a massively exploding bibliography; and an imperative to reconstruct the past in ever finer detail by using the tools of micro--history and thick description forged by anthropologists before they found their way into the hands of historians. Braudel lamented that the other human sciences had overlooked the distinctive contribution of history to solving the crisis, a solution that went to the heart of the social reality that was the focus of all humane inquiry: 'this opposition … between the moment and slowly unfolding time'. Between these two poles lay the conventional time--scales used in narrative history and by social and economic historians: spans of ten, twenty, fifty years at most. Histories of crises and cycles along these lines obscured the deeper regularities and continuities underlying the processes of change, Braudel believed. It was essential, he argued, to move to a 25 Fernand Braudel, 'Préface' (1946) Braudel's motives for promoting the longue durée were as much institutional as intellectual. He had just assumed the editorship of France's leading historical journal, Annales, and the presidency of one of its leading intellectual institutions, the VI e Section of the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. 28 From these lofty pinnacles of French academic life, had to justify the primacy of history among the other social sciences, particularly economics and anthropology.
In this competitive context, where prestige and funding were at stake as much as professional pride, the historians' longue dureé was the alternative to mathematics as the key to integrating the human sciences.
Braudel ranged l'histoire événementielle against the longue durée not because such history could only treat the ephemeral-what he famously called the 'spume' and 'fireflies' of history -but because it was a history too closely tied to events. In this respect, it was like the work of contemporary economists who, he charged, had harnessed their work to current affairs and to the short--term imperatives of governance. Such a myopic form of historical understanding, tethered to power and focused on the present, evaded explanation, and was allergic to theory: in Braudel's view, it lacked both critical distance and intellectual substance. This agenda also dovetailed neatly with the rise of futurology -the forward--looking counterpart to the longue durée -on both sides of the Atlantic in the aftermath of World War Two. The two agendas were closely intertwined, a long past giving substance to an equally long future. 29 In this context, it was no coincidence that the very term 'long--range' had migrated from ballistics (think of long--range weapons), to futurology (think of long--range weather forecasting) and from there to history (the longue durée). 'cult of professionalism' that meant 'more and more academic historians were writing more and more academic history that fewer and fewer people were actually reading'. The result 'was that all too often, the role of the historian as public teacher was effectively destroyed'. 31 Professionalisation had led to marginalisation.
Historians were increasingly cut off from non--specialist readers as they talked only to one another about ever narrower topics studied on ever shorter time--scales.
The explanations for this retreat from the public sphere and fear of long--term history were many: the turn towards 'thick description' imported from anthropology; the rise of micro--history with its concentration of specific events, peculiar individuals, and intractable documents; the 'scepticism towards grand narratives' that famously defined post--modernism; the move of many adjacent disciplines from holism and synthesis to disaggregation and analysis (think of the rise of microeconomics or analytic philosophy, for instance); and a more general orientation towards the immediate, the present, the here and now all contributed to the centrifugal forces working against longer--term perspectives and the triumph of the short durée. 32 Civil war has always been an essentially contested concept and cannot be precisely contained. It is therefore a prime suspect for long--range intellectual history aimed at unsettling the certainties of policy--makers and journalists by adding complexity and historical depth to current debates. But it is only one such object -a host of other transtemporal intellectual histories are emerging now, of occupation and empire, of common sense and genius, of ambition and disobedience. 39 At least one historical field -intellectual history, or the history of ideas -is overcoming its resistance to the longue durée, and others are already following. 40 Indeed, big is back across a spectrum of new and revived modes of historical origins of the universe itself. More modest in scope, because it includes only the human past, is the still remarkably expansive 'Deep History' which spans some 40,000 years and deliberately breaks through the entrenched boundary between 'history' and 'pre--history'. And more focused still, yet with perhaps the most immediate resonance for present concerns, is the history of the Anthropocene, the period in which human beings have comprised a collective actor powerful enough to affect the environment on a planetary scale. 41 The time--scales of these movements are, respectively, cosmological, archaeological, and climatological: each represents a novel expansion of historical perpectives, and each operates on horizons longerusually much longer -than a generation, a human lifetime, or the other roughly biological time--spans that have defined most recent historical writing. not run in the ruts of the past. It is possible to jump the tracks and take a new direction, just as it is feasible to go back through the past to discover paths not taken.
Only by scaling our inquiries over so many decades, centuries, or even millennia, can we hope to understand the genesis of our present discontents. And only by delving deep into the past can we hope to project ourselves imaginatively any meaningful distance into the future: for, as Winston Churchill once said, 'the longer you can look back, the further you can look forward '. 42 For these reasons, the future of the past is in the hands of historians. Armed with both transnational and transtemporal perspectives, historians can be guardians against parochial perspectives and endemic short--termism. Once called upon to offer their advice on political development and land--reform, the creation of the welfare state and post--conflict settlement, historians, along with other humanists, effectively ceded the public arena, nationally as well as globally, to the economists and occasionally to lawyers and political scientists. 
